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FORCING ATTORNEYS TO 
REPRESENT INDIGENT CIVIL 
LITIGANTS: THE PROBLEMS AND 
SOME PROPOSALS 
Indigents confront a basic inequity in our civil litigation sys-
tem: the inability to afford counsel. In response to this inequity, 
Congress established the Legal Services Corporation (Corpora-
tion) in 1974 to aid indigent litigants. 1 Congress originally 
sought to provide one legal services lawyer for every 5,000 poor 
people eligible for the program.2 In 1981, however, Congress re-
duced the Corporation's budget3 and, as a result, the ratio of 
legal services lawyers to indigents eligible for legal services has 
dropped to approximately one to 9,585.4 
In addition, these budget cuts represent only a fraction of so-
cial services reductions. 11 Like the nonpoor, the poor need law-
yers for tort, contract, civil liberty, and family law problems.6 
Unlike the nonpoor, however, the poor also need lawyers to as-
1. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 88 Stat. 378 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1982)). The Legal Services Corporation 
(Corporation) is a nonprofit, private corporation with its principal office in the District of 
Columbia. § 2996. The Corporation attempts to provide "financial support for legal assis-
tance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal 
assistance."§ 2996b. The Corporation is not an agency of the United States Government, 
and both private organizations and Congress provide the Corporation with funds. § 
2996i(a), (c). 
2. See Siegel, Without a Lawyer the Poor Can't Complain, Civil Liberties, June 
1983, at 5; see also L. FORER, MONEY AND JUSTICE 103 (1984). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996i amended 1981. The amendment cut the Corporation's 
budget 25~;,, from $321 million to $241 million. Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 2, at 5; 
N.Y. Times, June 19, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 3. The budget has remained unchanged since 
the cut. 
4. See Pollack, Lawyers Flock to the Rich, Shun the Poor, Rocky Mountain News, 
June 27, 1983, at 39, cited in L. Fo&ER, supra note 2, at 58. 
5. See L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 103. See also N.Y. Times, July 26, 1984, § 1, at 19, 
col. 1 (reporting that the nonpartisan congressional research service estimated that fed-
eral social program restrictions created 557,000 more poor people); N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 
1982, § 1, at 27, col. 6 (stating that 3,000 New York City families lost welfare benefits 
because of federal spending cuts); N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (stating that 
social service programs are struggling to maintain activities as budgets decrease and 
number of people seeking aid increases). 
6. See L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 103. 
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sist with problems peculiar to indigency, for instance, to oppose 
utility rate hikes, foreclosures, and entitlement cutbacks. 7 Social 
services reductions create more legal problems for the poor in 
these areas,8 necessitating an even greater demand for counsel. 
In response to this, many courts have forced attorneys to re-
present, without compensation, indigent civil litigants.9 Al-
though these courts maintain that the practice is traditional, 10 in 
fact its origins are unclear.11 Whatever its source, this practice 
places on attorneys the burden of representing indigent civil liti-
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that re-
quest for appointment of counsel should not be denied solely because attorney is uncom-
pensated), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (holding that although funds unavailable for compensation, court can appoint 
counsel in civil rights action); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 
(1983) (holding that until legislature determines otherwise, attorneys must perform legal 
services for indigents gratuitously), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 
425 (1985) (ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary 
to give defendant access to court but not considering whether courts possess the power 
to appoint attorneys without compensation); Ex parte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 
440, 442 (1983) (holding that court may appoint attorneys to represent, without compen-
sation, indigent civil litigant); Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 85 Nev. 149, 150, 451 
P.2d 708, 709 (1969) (holding that upon court order, attorney is obligated to represent, 
without compensation, indigent civil litigants); see also Note, The Indigent's "Right" to 
Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 989, 1004-06 (1975). But see Bradshaw v. 
Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that in Title VII 
action, district court has power to deny coercive appointment of counsel when voluntary 
counsel could not be located to assist plaintiff; the court, however, remanded for ap-
pointment of counsel); Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 201 Cal. Rptr. 
893, 895 (1984) (holding court cannot appoint unwilling counsel to represent indigent 
civil litigant); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 748 (1983) (King, J., 
concurring) (arguing that to alleviate burden on attorneys, legislature should appropriate 
funds to compensate appointed counsel in civil cases), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 
583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of 
counsel necessary to give defendant access to courts but not considering whether courts 
possess the power to appoint attorneys without compensation); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 
399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (finding all constitutional claims against uncompen-
sated, court appointments invalid, but relieving attorneys of this burden because it is too 
great); Comments, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional 
and Social Transgression, 60 Kv. L.J. 710, 721 (1972) (stating that forced, uncompen-
sated court appointments violate the Constitution and represent poor policy). 
This Note does not address court appointments in criminal cases. Criminal defendants 
are entitled to representation under the sixth amendment, see infra note 30, while civil 
litigants are entitled to counsel only in certain cases, see infra note 31. Thus, the ques-
tion of whether counsel should be forced to accept uncompensated court appointments 
in criminal cases involves a potentially overriding right of defendants, a right not in-
volved in civil cases. Therefore, to avoid simplistic, overbroad analysis, appointments in 
civil cases should be considered separately from those in criminal cases. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 978 (1966). • 
11. See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 
753 (1980); see also infra note 105. 
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gants in matters for which the nonpoor consult legal counsel, as 
well as in those additional matters that disproportionately affect 
the poor. Consequently, this burden has increased in reponse to 
the social services reductions. 12 
This practice has been considered by the American Bar Asso-
ciation as well. Ethical Consideration 2-16 of the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility sets forth the presently nonobli-
gatory, pro bono aspiration in the states.13 Recently, the Kutak 
Commission proposed a mandatory Disciplinary Rule of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would have required a 
pro bono commitment of all attorneys. u The Bar Association de-
12. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 744 (1983) (King, J., 
concurring), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering 
trail court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant 
access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attor-
neys without compensation). The concurrence in Yarbrough stated: 
In retrospect the federal government may have perpetrated a cruel hoax by mak-
ing available free legal services to those who needed them but who could not 
afford them, and then sharply reducing, if not virtually terminating, this essen-
tial service. Just when poorer citizens were for the first time given a vehicle for 
the exercise of their legal rights, it is being withdrawn from them. For this rea-
son now, more than at any other time in our history, more lawyers are represent-
ing more low income clients without compensation. 
Id. at 744. 
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16, 2-19 (1980). Ethical Con-
sideration 2-16 states that "persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee 
should be able to obtain necessary legal services, and lawyers should support and partici-
pate in ethical activities designed to achieve that objective." Ethical Consideration 2-25 
states: 
The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ulti-
mately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the 
problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in 
the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or pro-
fessional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. 
These Ethical Considerations are, however, only "aspirational in character and re-
present [an objective] toward which every member of the profession should strive." 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980). The Ethi-
cal Considerations are nonobligatory. Although pro bono representation is a matter of 
choice, attorneys should strive to represent the financially disadv~taged. 
14. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction (Proposed 
Final Draft 1981) (calling for mandatory pro bono legal services); see also Palmer & 
Aaronson, Placing Pro Bono Publico in the National Legal Services Strategy, 66 AB.A. 
J. 851 (1980). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) are a comprehensive 
revision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The Code, originally 
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1969, has been adopted, with variation, in 
the majority of states. ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1:301. The primary 
objective of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Implementation of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is to persuade the states to convert to the 
Rules. [Current Reports] ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 93. 
Under a mandatory obligation, an attorney would have been subject to coercive sanc-
tions for failing to provide pro bono services. Courts enforce the Disciplinary Rules 
through disbarment, fine, or censure. See, e.g., Tarver v. State Bar, 37 Cal. 3d 122, 134-
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cided, however, to continue "the nonobligatory professional 
standard set forth in the current Code ... ",111 concluding that 
the constitutionality of forced, uncompensated court appoint-
ments remains uncertain. 16 
This Note argues that uncompensated court appointments re-
present an unsatisfactory means to provide counsel for indi-
gents. Part I discusses the policy arguments for and against 
forced, uncompensated court appointments. Part I concludes 
that the arguments against these appointments outweigh the ar-
guments in favor of them. Part II argues that they violate the 
Constitution's prohibitions against uncompensated takings and 
involuntary servitude. Part III offers a proposal that would pro-
vide effective representation for indigent civil litigants, while 
avoiding infringement of attorneys' constitutional rights. 
I. POLICY INTERESTS 
Because attorneys should aid in improving the legal profes-
sion, 17 one could argue that attorneys should provide adequate 
representation for indigents, thus justifying uncompensated 
court appointments. 18 The Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility supports this position. Ethical Consideration 8-9 states 
that when attorneys represent indigent civil litigants rather than 
leave them unrepresented, attorneys enhance the judicial pro-
35, 688 P.2d 911, 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 302, 309 (1984) (holding that comingling funds, 
misappropriating funds, and charging unconscionable fee, in violation of professional 
code, justifies disbarment). 
15. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 6.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981): 
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this 
responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to 
persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organiza-
tions, or by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the 
legal profession; (Emphasis added.) 
This provision avoids making pro bono representation .obligatory. 
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 6.1 notes (Proposed Final Draft 
1981). 
17. See MoDEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-9 (1980) ("The advance-
ment of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of law and . . . 
lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes and 
improvements."). 
18. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1983) (noting that 
attorneys have an "interest in maintaining the integrity of the adversary system by see-
ing to it that every good faith litigant, regardless of means, is adequately represented."), 
vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial court to 
reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to courts 
· but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys without 
compensation). 
SPRING 1985] Forced Representation of Indigents 771 
cess's integrity and fairness. 19 
Although attorneys have this interest, forcing only some attor-
neys to represent indigent civil litigants unfairly allocates the 
profession's burden. When courts unevenly distribute court ap-
pointments among attorneys, the chosen attorneys face a choice: 
they may either raise fees for paying clients or absorb the cost of 
representing indigent civil litigants themselves.20 If a court-ap-
pointed attorney raises fees for paying clients, the attorney's 
paying clients may seek a more competitively priced attorney; 
thus, this choice could force the attorney to bear the high cost of 
lost business. Conversely, if these paying clients remain with the 
attorney, they must bear the burden.21 Alternatively, the attor-
ney may leave fees unchanged. Here, the attorney directly bears 
the burden. Hence, if courts unevenly distribute court appoint-
ments among attorneys, some attorneys, and their paying cli-
ents, disproportionately bear the cost of representing indigents. 
Ostensibly, the even distribution of court appointments 
among attorneys offers a remedy to this dilemma because the 
entire profession would proportionately bear the burden. Two 
strong policy interests, however, justify public compensation of 
court-appointed attorneys for indigent clients. First, the public 
as a whole benefits both directly and indirectly from civil litiga-
tion brought by indigents. Second, the public has an interest in 
the fair administration of justice. 
A. Public Interest in Supporting Indigent Litigation 
The public as a whole has benefited from publicly-funded civil 
litigation brought by, or on behalf of, indigent plaintiffs.22 For 
instance, malpractice suits against professionals have resulted in 
improved services and observance of ethical standards. 23 Suits 
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-9 (1980). 
20. See Comments, supra note 9, at 722 (suggesting that attorneys will transfer cost 
of representing indigent clients to paying clients). 
21. Cf. id. 
22. See L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 43; cf. Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 
737, 745 (1983) (King, J., concurring) (noting that uncompensated court-appointed attor-
neys discharge a public function), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 
425 (1985) (ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary 
to give defendant access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power 
to appoint attorneys without compensation); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 
1971) (en bane) (announcing that court will no longer compel attorneys to discharge the 
state's burden). 
23. See L. FORER, supra note 2, at 34. 
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brought by prisoners have revealed illegal practices in our prison 
system,24 improving the system's quality and, in the long run, 
decreasing the public expense of prisoner litigation through 
elimination of illegal practices.211 Suits protecting the right of the 
mentally ill to receive treatment in the least possible restrictive 
environment have caused a decrease in the number of state 
mental institutions from 600,000 to 150,000, thus saving the 
public $4.5 billion each year.28 The New York State Legislature's 
appropriation of $1 million to facilitate representation for people 
to whom the federal government denies social security disability 
or supplemental security income benefits could save state and 
local governments an estimated $7 million to $10 million each 
year.27 These examples evidence the extensive public benefits 
derived from civil litigation brought by those unable to afford 
counsel.28 Because the public benefits, fairness requires that the 
public share the expense. Rather than force some subgroup of 
the public, such as attorneys or their clients, to finance these 
cases, the federal and state governments, as representatives of 
the public, should provide counsel to the indigent. 29 
24. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding that prisoners were de-
nied medical attention); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding perma-
nently disabling drugs were used on adults in mental institutions); Morales v. Turman, 
383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (finding that children in custody were forced to use 
drugs), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 539 F.2d 710, rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 
(1977); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (finding that inadequate 
care was provided to inmates giving birth), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); see also L. 
FoRER, supra note 2, at 33. 
25. L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 33. But see Note, Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the 
Federal Courts: Proposals for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 93, 99-115 (1984) 
(arguing that increased opportunities for prisoner litigation have resulted in increasing 
public expense). 
26. L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 39. 
27. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, § 1, at 29, col. 1. 
28. L. F0RER, supra note 2, at 33-43. Forer lists many of the innumerable benefits to 
the public as a whole that have resulted from civil litigation brought by indigent clients. 
29. See Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 745 (1983) (King, J., con-
curring) (arguing that court-appointed attorneys perform a public function and deserve 
public compensation), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) 
(ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give de-
fendant access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint 
attorneys without compensation); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972) (dis-
continuing uncompensated court appointments and declaring that the duty to appropri-
ate funds for compensating court-appointed attorneys rests on the legislature); State v. 
Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971) (en bane) (announcing court will no longer compel 
attorneys to accept court appointments but will wait for legislature to act); State v. 
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 408, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (deciding financial burden and time 
commitment imposed on attorneys too great and leaving problem to legislature); State ex 
rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 822, 227 S.E.2d 314, 323 (1976) ("With deference 
to the legislative process, then, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to order only 
that the lawyers of this State may no longer be required to accept appointments as in 
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Forcing attorneys to represent indigents may also reduce the 
public benefits that this litigation can provide. Effective repre-
sentation for the indigent requires an attorney-client relation-
ship based on trust and confidence and requires an attorney 
with the time and other resources necessary to pursue zealously 
a client's case. A forced appointment may undermine this rela-
tionship, and a court-appointed attorney may lack the time and 
resources necessary to represent the client effectively. This im-
paired effectiveness reduces the benefits that this litigation 
might otherwise provide the public. Therefore, the public as a 
whole has an interest in supplying the funds necessary to pro-
vide effective counsel to indigent civil litigants. 
1. Public interest in effective representation for indigents-
Although the sixth amendment entitles an indigent criminal de-
fendant to representation, 30 the Constitution does not generally 
afford a right to representation to indigent civil litigants.31 A 
convicted criminal defendant may face a direct loss of life or lib-
erty not faced by a losing civil litigant. 32 Thus, the Constitution 
rightly requires representation for indigent criminal defendants. 
Nevertheless, a losing civil litigant may face losses as severe as 
the past."); see also Swygert, Should Indigent Civil Litigants in the Federal Courts 
Have a Right to Appointed Counsel, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1267, 1298 (1982) (arguing 
that forcing attorneys to represent, without compensation, indigent clients, is unfair to 
lawyers as a group); cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (appointing counsel 
for an indigent client, the Court spoke of the financial cost to the State for appointed 
counsel, though not deciding that the State should bear the cost). 
30. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial 
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-42 (1978). Indigents are entitled to 
counsel only in certain cases. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (holding that indigent parent was not entitled to appointed counsel where claim 
was so weak that counsel would not have helped, but stating that decision whether to 
appoint counsel should be determined on a case-by-case basis). But see Payne v. Supe-
rior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976) (holding that indigent 
prisoner named as civil defendant entitled to appointed counsel in proper circum-
stances); Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 GEO. L.J. 
113, 115 (1977) (arguing that indigents have a right to appointed counsel in civil cases). 
32. See, e.g., In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 
89 (N.D. Ala. 1979) ("Special dispensations are made to the accused of our system of 
criminal justice, so it shall remain fair, and so as to protect the life and liberty of the 
defendant."); cf. Note, supra note 9, at 1004 (noting that although an attorney represent-
ing a criminal defendant may be entitled to compensation, an attorney representing an 
indigent civil litigant is not necessarily so entitled because of the lesser sanctions in-
volved in civil cases). 
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those of a convicted criminal defendant.33 Indeed, a losing civil 
litigant may indirectly lose a significant liberty interest.3 ' 
Furthermore, civil cases present substantive and procedural 
issues as complex as those found in criminal cases. 311 In cases 
where a court appoints an attorney, a judge has determined that 
the indigent cannot handle the case without assistance.36 In ad-
dition, in civil cases trained counsel often represents the oppos-
ing party.37 Therefore, although an indigent may have no consti-
tutional right to counsel, if a court finds that an indigent needs 
representation38 then that party should have effective 
representation. 39 
33. A civil litigant could lose the means of subsistence. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits, 
which the Court characterized as a necessity). 
34. The Court stated in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 551 (1972) 
that "a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and 
the personal right to property. Neither would have meaning without the other. That 
rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized." The property rights at 
stake in many civil suits are thus inextricably tied to individual personal liberty. 
35. See Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.l, 7 (1964) 
("Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with 
practiced and carefully counseled adversaries .... "); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of 
San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Civil rights litigants are presumptively 
incapable of handling complex litigation themselves and of protecting themselves against 
the serious prejudice that occurs at trials in which the adversaries are represented by the 
most sophisticated law firms."); Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 271, 
201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 (1984) ("[E]xpanding concepts in law have increased the volume 
of assignments, the complexity of the issues involved, and a mushrooming of the duties 
involved in an appointed case.") (quoting County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 
App. 3d 191, 202, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (1978) (Hopper, J., dissenting)); cf. Note, Court 
Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Le-
gal Assistance, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 366, 373 n.53 (1981) (arguing that uncompensated 
court appointments are constitutional and stating that in both civil and criminal cases, 
"the fairness of the proceeding is promoted" through the appointment of counsel). 
36. See. supra note 35. 
37. Id .. 
38. Despite the absence of a constitutional right to counsel, a court may still find that 
an indigent civil litigant is entitled to representation for a number of reasons. One im-
portant reason is that the importance of the right at stake necessitates representation. 
See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(stating that in Title VII action lack of counsel severely prejudices civil rights litigants). 
Further, courts appoint attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants because "[t]he ma-
jority of indigents lack the education, the leisure, the facilities, and the familiarity with 
libraries and bureaucracies that are essential to pursue a legal claim, particularly one 
against the government. Without lawyers, these people have no access to civil justice." L. 
FoRER, supra note 2, at 103. For a discussion of'the need for a right to counsel in civil 
cases, see Note, supra note 31. 
39. Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 272; 201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 
(1984); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 746 (1983) (King, J., concur-
ring), vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial 
court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to 
courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys with-
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Unfortunately, forced appointments may provide ineffective 
representation. First, lack of compensation may reduce an attor-
ney's incentives. ' 0 Second, lack of compensation may reduce the 
resources with which the attorney can represent the indigent cli-
ent. 41 Third, as a result of accepting a forced, uncompensated 
court appointment, an attorney may become so overburdened 
with cases that the indigent client's case receives inadequate 
effort.'2 
One may argue that a contingent fee arrangement or a post-
judgment claim for attorney's fees would eliminate· or reduce 
these first two disincentives. Thus, when either a contigent fee 
or a claim for fee is available to a court-appointed attorney, the 
appointing judge need not worry about the lack of incentive or 
resources. Further, if a judge or an attorney could be confident 
that the appointment would not overburden the attorney, then 
the final disincentive would be removed as well. Hence, an ap-
pointment in these circumstances would not violate the policy of 
providing an indigent party with effective representation. Still, if 
out compensation); Comments, supra note 9, at 727. 
40. See Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 273, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 
(1984) (stating that compelled representation may "deprive the indigent of effective as-
sistance of counsel"); Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 77 
Wash. 2d 660, 679, 466 P.2d 485, 496 (1970) (en bane) (stating that forcing attorney to 
accept uncompensated, court appointment may tend to detract from quality of attor-
ney's representation); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CouRT JUSTICE 29-30 (1963) (noting that 75% of criminal 
clients represented by federally appointed attorneys entered guilty pleas while only 25% 
of clients represented by retained counsel pied guilty); Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: 
They Do Not Meet Constitutional Mandate, 49 AB.A. J. 435, 436 (1963); Williams & 
Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise in Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32 (1971); 
Comments, supra note 9, at 710. But see State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A.2d 441, 
444 (1966) ("A lawyer needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his pride."). In 
Mowrer, however, the court noted that despite its "hope that every attorney would de-
rive satisfaction from a job done well, . . . it may be unrealistic ... to expect satisfac-
tion to constitute the sole motivation for an attorney to expend maximum effort. The 
more conscientious[ly] the attorney fights for the indigent's cause, the greater the finan-
cial loss suffered by the attorney." 155 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 899. Thus, 
although satisfaction or pleasure derived from helping an indigent may be a strong moti-
vating force, an uncompensated attorney may put forth a less than maximum effort. 
41. See Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 746 (1983) (King, J., con-
curring) (stating that lack of compensation deprives attorney of funds with which to 
represent the client), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) 
(ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give de-
fendant access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint 
attorneys without compensation); Comments, supra note 9, at 710. But cf. State v. Rush, 
46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A.2d 441, 445 (1966) (stating that outcome of case is more depen-
dent on applicable law than on advocate's skill). 
42. Cf. State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 681 P.2d 1374 (1984) (finding that a bid system, 
in which attorneys submitted bids to state and state chose lowest bidder to represent 
indigent criminal defendants, resulted in overburdened attorneys). 
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a court forces only some attorneys to represent indigent civil liti-
gants, the unfair burden on these attorneys or their clients 
remains. 
Absent either a contingent fee arrangement or a claim for fee, 
an attorney judicially appointed to represent an indigent may 
provide that client with ineffective representation.43 Because the 
public has an interest in civil litigation brought by indigents,"" 
the public also has an interest in ensuring effective representa-
tion for those indigents. The public interest in effective repre-
sentation thus justifies public compensation of attorneys who 
represent indigent civil litigants. 
2. Public interest in an effective attorney-client relation-
ship- Forced, uncompensated court appointments may also in-
trude upon the attorney-client relationship,"" a relationship that 
depends upon trust and confidence.46 A client's concern that a, 
forced, uncompensated appointee will put forth less than an en-
thusiastic effort may undermine the trust and confidence that 
the relationship demands.47 Absent trust and confidence, a client 
may be unwilling to disclose essential information. Thus, uncom-
pensated court appointments may impair the trust and confi-
dence essential to an effective attorney-client relationship. Be-
cause the public benefits from civil litigation,48 and effective 
litigation requires trust and confidence between attorney and 
client, the public has_ an interest in promoting that trust and 
confidence. Therefore, the public has an interest in compensat-
ing attorneys appointed to represent indigents as a means to 
43. Indigents who have cases where a contingent fee may be possible can probably 
find their own attorneys and, therefore, will not seek court appointments. Duniway, The 
Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270, "1285 (1966). Thus, indigents 
receiving court appointments may be comprised of those litigants whose cases did not 
present the opportunity for a contingent fee. Absent a statutory claim for fees, an ap-
pointed attorney in such a case may not put forth a maximum effort. 
44. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying-text. 
45. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 91 (N.D. 
Ala. 1979). The court in Nine Applications objected "to the judicial intrusion upon the 
attorney-client relationship exacted by Section 2000e-5(O(1)" of Title VII, which permits 
a court to appoint, at its discretion, uncompensated counsel. The court continued, 
"[T]he statute allows to be forced that which by its very nature cannot be forced, the 
fiduciary relationship between the client and his attorney." Id. 
46. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 91 (N.D. 
Ala. 1979) ("Trust and confidence are imperative" to the attorney-client relationship); 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980) ("A client must feel free to 
discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain 
information beyond that volunteered by his client."). 
47. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 91 (N.D. 
Ala. 1979) ("[W]hile an attorney is ethically bound to give any client his all, the amount 
of trust and confidence to be found in a compelled relationship is questionable at best."). 
48. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. 
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achieve an effective attorney-client relationship. 
B. Unfairness in the Judicial Process 
Forced, uncompensated court appointments also undermine 
the fairness of the judicial process. 49 When a court determines 
that an indigent needs representation, it bases its decision in 
part on the party's inability to handle the case without assist-
ance or on the importance of the party's interest.110 Thus, with-
out counsel, an indigent that a court determines needs counsel 
stands at a severe disadvantage when compared with a litigant 
who can afford counsel. Courts, however, should dispense justice 
on the merits of the claim, not on the resources of the partici-
pants. By providing ineffective representation to those who need 
representation111 and hindering the trust and confidence neces-
sary between attorney and client,62 forced, uncompensated court 
appointments undermine the fairness of the judicial process. 
Furthermore, poverty unequally burdens different age groups, 
races, and sexes.113 Therefore, when courts deny indigents eff ec-
tive legal representation, courts further prejudice already disad-
vantaged groups.114 This additional hurdle of inadequate legal 
representation exacerbates the unfairness of the discriminatory 
practices that created the disproportionate poverty of these dis-
advantaged groups. Thus, forced, uncompensated court appoint-
ments increase existing unfairness in the judicial process. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
The policy arguments against forced court appointments1111 
have provided a strong impetus for finding that the practice vio-
lates the Constitution. Thus, courts and commentators have ar-
gued that .forced, uncompensated court appointments are uncon-
49. Yarbrough v. Superior Court,197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 746 (1983) (King, J., concurring), 
vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial court to 
reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to courts 
but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys without com-
pensation); Note, supra note 31, at 115; Comments, supra note 9, at 727. 
50. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
51. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
53. L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 18; see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1983, § 1, at 11, col. 1. 
54. L. FORER, supra note 2, at 18; see, e.g., N.Y. Times, supra note 53. 
55. See supra notes 17-54 and accompanying text. 
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stitutional. 56 These arguments have focused on invalidating the 
usual justification for forced, uncompensated court appoint-
ments: the attorney's position as officer of the court.57 Propo-
nents of forced appointments maintain that attorneys fulfill the 
officer-of-the-court obligation as a condition of the license to 
practice law.58 Thus, by applying for admission to the bar, an 
attorney is deemed to have accepted the condition, because the 
prospective attorney should be aware of the profession's obliga-
tions.59 Consequently, because attorneys accept the condition of 
becoming an officer of the court, they accept the concomitant 
56. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that coercive appointments violate thirteenth amendment); Mowrer v. Superior 
Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1984) (holding that coercive appoint-
ments constitute a taking and violate fourteenth amendment equal protection clause); 
Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 743 (1983) (King, J., concurring) (argu-
ing same), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial 
court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to 
courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys with-
out compensation); Comments, supra note 9 (arguing that forced court appointments 
violate fifth, fourteenth, and thirteenth amendments). But see Yarbrough v. Superior 
Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1983) (holding that coercive appoint-
ments do not violate the Constitution); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) 
(holding that coercive appointments are constitutional). 
57. Many cases have discussed the traditional justification i;; favor of uncompensated 
court appointments, that an attorney is an officer of the court. See, e.g., United States v. 
Dillon, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Or. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) 
("[R]epresentation of indigents under court order, without a fee, is a condition under 
which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the court."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
978 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska 1966) (holding that as officer of 
the court, attorney is obligated to accept uncompensated, court appointments); Yar-
brough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1983) (accepting same traditional ar-
gument), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial 
court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to 
courts); Note, supra note 9, at 1005 (same); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) 
(dicta) (stating that attorneys are officers of the court and are bound to accept court 
appointments). But see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 753 ("To justify coerced, uncompen-
sated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in England and the United States is 
to read into that tradition a story that is not there."), quoted in Mowrer v. Superior 
Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 268, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 895 (1984). The tradition is espe-
cially nebulous in the case of civil appointments. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 750-53. 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 978 (1966); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1983), va-
cated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial court to 
reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to courts 
but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys without com-
pensation); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 585, 555 P.2d 490, 492 (1976) (stating that a 
duty to accept uncompensated court appointments "is an incident of the license to prac-
tice law"). 
59. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) ("An applicant for ad-
mission to practice law may justly be deemed to . . . know that one of those conditions 
[of the profession] is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indi-
gents for little or no compensation upon court order."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). 
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duty to represent, without compensation, indigent clients. 
Although the argument's adherents assert that an individual 
may choose not to represent indigent clients by choosing not to 
become an attorney, those who argue against forced, uncompen-
sated court appointments note that the government cannot con-
dition a benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right.60 
Specifically, they refer to cases in which the Supreme Court has 
invalidated conditions attached to the license to practice law 
that induce an attorney to relinquish first amendment rights,61 
equal protection rights,62 and the right to free association.63 In 
these cases, the Court seems to suggest that the choice between 
relinquishing these rights or foregoing the practice of law is no 
real choice. 
Relying on these cases, courts and commentators have argued 
that for the practicing attorney, the choice between accepting a 
court appointment or facing either disbarment or loss of profes-
sional status also constitutes no real choice.6" Because of the ex-
60. See Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
144 (1968), which defines the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as follows: 
[W]hile a government, state or federal, may not be obligated to provide its citi-
zens with a certain benefit or privilege, it may not grant the benefit or privilege 
on conditions requiring the recipient in some manner to relinquish his constitu-
tional rights. Furthermore, it cannot withhold or cancel the benefit as a price of 
the assertion of such rights. 
Id. at 144 (footnote omitted). But see State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A.2d 441, 445 
(1966) (holding that if obligation to represent indigent clients without compensation is 
viewed as a condition to the practice of law, constitutional claims fail). 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied, inter alia, to freedom of 
speech, Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), 
freedom of association, Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Bagley v. Washington 
Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); Lawsen v. 
Housing Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955), and 
takings of property without just compensation, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad 
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). 
61. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that state bar may not impose 
ban on legal clinic's advertisement of services and fees). 
62. In re Griffths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that state bar may not exclude resi-
dent aliens). 
63. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that state bar may not require 
applicant to disclose whether he or she is a member of an organization that advocates 
forcible overthrow of the government). 
64. See, e.g., In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 
88 (N.D. Ala. 1979) ("A member of the bar is hard pressed to refuse to cooperate with 
the court before which he or she practices."); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 
Rptr. 737, 741 (1983) (holding that appointing courts can compel attorneys to represent 
civil litigants), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering 
trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant 
access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attor-
neys without compensation); Comments, supra note 9, at 717 ("If an attorney refuses the 
appointment he risks a possible [contempt] fine, imprisonment, and loss of his 
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treme loss of benefits accompanying a denial of the ability to 
practice law, the situation virtually compels an attorney to ac-
cept an appointment. Similarly, the potential attorney faces the 
choice whether to pursue the practice of law and possibly forego 
constitutional rights or not to practice law. But because the 
state cannot condition either the decision to remain an attorney 
or to become an attorney upon the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional right, the existence of an apparent choice whether to re-
main an attorney or whether to become one does not def eat a 
constitutional challenge. 
Opponents of forced appointments have proffered at least 
three such challenges. One may summarily dismiss the first of 
these, which is based on the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause. 65 Because the Court does not recognize attorneys 
as a suspect classification,66 or the ability to practice law as a 
fundamental right,67 the Court would apply only a minimum 
livelihood."). 
65. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under this clause, some have ar-
gued that because the state forces no other professional to perform services gratuitously, 
when the state forces an attorney to accept an uncompensated court appointment the 
state denies the attorney equal protection of the laws. Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 
Cal. App. 3d 262, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1984); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 
737, 743 (1983) (King, J., concurring), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel nec-
essary to give defendant access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the 
power to appoint attorneys without compensation); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. 
McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 
1972); Comments, supra note 9, at 715. But see Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 533 
(Ala.) (holding that because attorneys are members of a unique profession, attorneys are 
not denied equal protection of the laws when forced to represent indigent clients gratui-
tously), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979). 
66. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at §§ 15-14 to -15; cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (stating that classifications based on race, national origin and, 
potentially, sex are suspect classifications). 
67. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at §§ 15-14 to -15. Concededly, the Court has shown 
increased willingness to apply greater scrutiny to economic rights. Gunther, Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 37 (1972). Nevertheless. the willingness would not extend to 
attorneys. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.23 (1976), the Court de-
cided that, because a rule barring noncitizens imposed a further disadvantage on an al-
ready disadvantaged group, the Court would apply greater than a minimum scrutiny 
test. The Court would not be similarly sympathetic to attorneys, a nondisadvantaged 
group. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), the Court ap-
plied a rational basis test to strike down a state practice that denied an individual ad-
mission to the bar for arbitrary reasons. Because courts do not force attorneys to accept 
uncompensated court appointments for arbitrary reasons, the practice would not violate 
due process. Therefore, although the Court has shown a tendency to protect economic 
rights, it would probably not find that forced, uncompensated court appointments in-
fringe on a constitutionally protectable interest in a vocation. 
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scrutiny, rational basis test to court appointments.68 This equal 
protection challenge would probably fail because there exists 
some rational relation between forced, uncompensated court ap-
pointments and indigent parties' welfare69-the need to provide 
indigents legal services where funding is otherwise lacking, and 
the special obligations imposed upon members of the profes-
sional bar. 
Nonetheless, two valid constitutional claims against forced, 
uncompensated court appointments still exist. First, these ap-
pointments may deprive attorneys of property without just com-
pensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendment 
taking clauses. Second, they may impose involuntary servitude 
on attorneys in violation of the thirteenth amendment. 
A. Deprivation of Property without Just Compensation 
Courts and commentators have argued that forced, uncompen-
sated court appointments violate the fifth and fourteenth 
amendment guarantees70 against the taking of property without 
just compensation. 71 To constitute a compensable taking of 
68. Under this test, equal protection requires only that a classification rationally re-
lates to a legitimate state interest. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at §§ 16-2 to -4. 
69. One might also argue that because uncompensated attorneys are more likely to 
provide inadequate service, see supra notes 40-42, uncompensated court appointments 
deny indigent plaintiffs equal protection of the laws. See L. FORER, supra note 2, at 18; 
cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (invalidating a classification that 
caused ineligibility for federal employment to a class of persons already subject to a 
discriminatory bias). Because the Court has stated, however, that wealth is not a suspect 
classification, San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), the 
Court would apply only a rational basis test. Again, the Court would probably find that, 
where funding is not otherwise forthcoming, this practice is rationally based. 
70. The fifth amendment states that "[n)o person ... shall be deprived of ... prop-
erty ... without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment 
states that "[n]o state ... shall deprive any person of ... property, without due process 
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The fifth amendment just compensation require-
ment has been held applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); L. TRIBE, supra 
note 31, at§ 9-2. The fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against taking prop-
erty without just compensation applies to the judiciary as well as to the legislature. Id.; 
see, e.g., Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 230 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (D. Or. 1964) (noting 
that time is all that an attorney has to sell and holding that forced court appointments 
violate the fourteenth amendment taking clause), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633, cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 978 (1966); Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 268, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 
896 (1984) (stating that uncompensated, court-appointed attorney "is in effect forced to 
give away a portion of his livelihood" in violation of the fourteenth amendment taking 
clause); Bedford v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14, 447 P.2d 193, 194 (1968) (stating 
that service is attorney's only means to earn a living and holding that forcing an attorney 
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property, forced, uncompensated court appointments must sat-
isfy two requirements. First, an attorney's services must be 
property.72 Second, the practice of forced appointments must 
amount to a taking of that property.73 
First, an attorney's services should be considered property. On 
two occasions, the Court has suggested that the practice of law 
constitutes property and, therefore, deserves protection against 
taking without just compensation. 74 In one instance, the Court 
held that a state cannot exclude an individual from the practice 
of law for arbitrary reasons711 and, in the other, it held that a 
state cannot refuse admittance to the bar for reasons that deny 
due process or equal protection.76 Although these cases narrowly 
suggest that not to be excluded from the practice of law repre-
sents an interest in liberty, the cases suggest a broader tendency 
of the Court to regard the practice of law as protected by the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments. Under this broader reading of 
the cases, the distribution of attorney services by the govern-
ment would also be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
The Court has also applied the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment taking clauses to analogous situations, ruling that compen-
sation is required for governmental taking of materialman's 
liens77 and the taking of a patentee's ideas.78 An attorney's ser-
vices are property in the same way as the labor of a materialman 
or a patentee.79 Of course, state and federal legislatures have en-
acted specific laws to protect liens and patents. Thus, one may 
to give this service without compensation constitutes a compensable taking); State ex rel. 
Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 813-14, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1976) (noting that an 
attorney's "stock in trade" is time and holding that forcing an attorney to accept an 
uncompensated court appointment is a taking); see also Cheatham, Availability of Legal 
Services: The Responsibility of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 444 (1965) 
(arguing that uncompensated court appointment constitutes a taking of property without 
just compensation); Comments, supra note 9, at 715 (stating that an attorney's service is 
attorney's property and, therefore, uncompensated court appointment amounts to a tak-
ing of that property). 
72. Note, supra note 35, at 384. 
73. Id. at 384; cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
(finding no violation of taking clause because designation of Grand Central Terminal as 
an historical landmark did not constitute a taking), aff'g 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). 
74. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Note, supra note 35, at 385; 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 538 (1957). 
75. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 538 (1957). 
76. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
77. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
78. United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888). 
79. United States v. Dillon, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Or. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 
3d 388, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1983). 
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distinguish the lien and patent cases because, unlike labor gen-
erally, they represent a specific governmental grant of a property 
interest. Nonetheless, because labor represents an attorney's 
only marketable product, 80 and the Court has protected the 
practice of law against intrusions generally,81 an attorney's labor 
should qualify as property, at least where the state gives it to 
indigents. 
In addition, the state deprives the uncompensated, court-ap-
pointed attorney of the expenses of operating a law office. An 
attorney not only devotes time and labor to an uncompensated 
case but expends office resources as well. These expenses can be 
substantial. 82 These resources also qualify as property for pur-
poses of the constitutional taking clauses. 
Even if a court were to find that attorney services constitute 
property, it would still face the difficult question of whether 
forced court appointments amount to a taking of property. Be-
cause the Supreme Court has never directly held services 
equivalent to property, it has not had the opportunity to deter-
mine what circumstances would constitute a taking of such 
property. The Court has stated as a general matter, however, 
that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole. "83 As Professor Tribe writes, "the just 
compensation requirement appears to express a limit on govern-
ment's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the 
general good."84 When forced to accept uncompensated court 
appointments, attorneys bear such a burden. Because the fair 
administration of justice constitutes a public good, forcing attor-
neys to represent indigent clients without compensation uncon-
80. See supra note 71. 
81. Note, supra note 35, at 377; see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding 
that state bar may not impose ban on legal clinic's advertisement of services and fees); 
In re Griffths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that state bar may not exclude resident 
aliens); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that state bar may not require 
applicant to disclose whether he or she is a member of an organization that advocates 
forcible overthrow of the government). 
82. Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 747 (1983) (King, J., concur-
ring), vacated, 39 Cal.3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (ordering trial 
court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to give defendant access to 
courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to appoint attorneys with-
out compensation); Williams & Bost, supra note 40, at 34. Williams and Bost determined 
that an average law office's overhead is about 40% of gross income. Id. at 36. 
83. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
84. L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at § 9-4. 
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stitutionally isolates attorneys for sacrifice to the general good of 
the fair administration of justice. 
A final response to the taking clauses argument can also be 
dismissed. The Court has suggested that where the government 
provides a benefit with a reciprocal regulation, that regulation 
does not constitute a taking. 85 One could use this suggestion to 
argue that because attorneys receive a benefit through a monop-
oly in the practice of law, any regulation such as compelled rep-
resentation of indigents does not amount to a taking.86 The pro-
fession's status as a monopoly, however, remains questionable 
because there exists great competition among attorneys, and al-
ternative forms of dispute· resolution reduce the monopoly power 
of the profession as a whole.87 Thus, the government confers no 
special benefit upon lawyers that corresponds to the regulation. 
Consequently, when a court requires an attorney to represent an 
indigent client without compensation, it deprives the attorney of 
property without just compensation in violation of the taking 
clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. 
B. Imposition of Involuntary Servitude 
Courts and commentators88 have also argued that forced, un-
compensated court appointments violate the thirteenth am~nd-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.89 Because the 
amendment is self-executing, Congress need not enact any par-
ticular statute to realize the amendment's purpose.90 Therefore, 
opponents of forced appointments maintain that although there 
exists no specific statutory prohibition, the thirteenth amend-
ment itself forbids these appointments. 
The Supreme Court has made sweeping statements suggesting 
that the thirteenth amendment prohibits all forms of compul-
85. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see 
also Note, supra note 35, at 388. 
86. See Note, supra note 35, at 388. 
87. See Mowrer v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 270, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 
(1984). 
88. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 88-89 
(N.D. Ala. 1979); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 533 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 
803 (1979); see also Comments, supra note 9, at 716-17. 
89. The thirteenth amendment states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude ... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
90. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
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sory labor.91 It has stated that "[t]he undoubted aim of the 
Thirteenth Amendment was not merely to end slavery but to 
maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor 
throughout the United States."92 The thirteenth amendment 
thus served to achieve liberty not only for black slaves but 
serves to achieve liberty for all people. 93 
This language supports the claim that the thirteenth amend-
ment prohibits forced, uncompensated court appointments. The 
Court has applied the amendment to an analogous situation, 
holding on two occasions that statutes that compel debtors to 
perform labor to relieve indebtedness impose involuntary servi-
tude.94 The Court found in those cases that the state had uncon-
stitutionally substituted its will for the debtor's will. An attor-
ney asked to accept a court appointment faces similarly 
powerful coercion. 96 Because the court compels an attorney to 
accept an appointment,96 the attorney represents the indigent 
client involuntarily. In essence, the state substitutes its will for 
the attorney's will, and this substitution constitutes an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of the attorney's liberty. 
The debtor cases, however, involved state criminal statutes 
that authorized imprisonment of violators. Because attorneys 9-0 
not generally face imprisonment for refusing to accept a court 
appointment, 97 the reasoning of those cases may not extend to 
forced appointments.98 In an analogous case, the Court has af-
firmed a district court's decision that forcing a baseball player 
either to accept a trade to another club or to leave baseball did 
not constitute sufficient compulsion to amount to involuntary 
servitude because the player could still seek employment outside 
of baseball.99 This decision suggests that forcing an attorney to 
91. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) ("[T]he thirteenth 
amendment is not a mere prohibition of the State laws establishing or upholding slavery, 
but an absolute declaration· that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any 
part of the United States .... ") (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)); 
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (stating that thirteenth amendment was meant 
to achieve voluntary labor); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (stating that the 
intention behind thirteenth amendment was to make labor free). 
92. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
93. Id.; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); In re Nine Applications for Ap-
pointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87, 88 (N.D. Ala. 1979). 
94. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 
(1911); see Note, supra note 35, at 389. 
95. See supra note 64. 
96. See supra note 64. 
97. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 757. But see supra note 64. 
98. Note, supra note 35, at 389. 
99. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d 
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
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choose between accepting a court appointment or looking for 
employment outside the legal profession does not violate the 
thirteenth amendment. The holding was not based on the dis-
trict court's reasoning, however; the Supreme Court merely men-
tioned the district court's decision on the issue of involuntary 
servitude and instead concentrated its attention on other is-
sues.100 Additionally, the debtor cases on compulsory labor are 
more analogous to compelled representation because debtors 
faced the same element of work without pay as court-appointed 
attorneys.101 Finally, the absence of a threat of imprisonment 
should not be condemning to the thirteenth amendment argu-
ment, because the debtor cases were grounded primarily on the 
state's substitution of its will for that of the worker, whatever 
the consequences of failure to comply. The presence of compul-
sion is the controlling basis for the thirteenth amendment claim, 
and compulsion is present in the case of forced court 
appointments. 
An additional argument against the thirteenth amendment 
challenge has been created by the Court's holding that to compel 
an individual to perform a duty owed to the state does not con-
stitute involuntary servitude.102 In the related criminal area, 
when faced with the issue of whether the sixth amendment enti-
tled a criminal defendant to appointed counsel, the Court stated 
in dictum that "[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are 
bound to render service when required by such an appoint-
ment. "103 Unfortunately, these statements fail to address a num-
ber of important questions.10• For instance, are court-appointed 
attorneys entitled to compensation? Do attorneys have an ethi-
cal duty to the state to represent indigents, and if not, may the 
state still compel them to render free services? The Court has 
never directly held that attorneys owe the state a duty to repre-
sent indigents, either civil litigants or criminal defendants, with-
100. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 769; Note, supra note 35, at 389. 
101. See supra note 64. 
102. See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 & n.11 (1973) (uphold-
ing statutory requirement that incarcerated witness serve as witness for one dollar); But-
ler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (stating that prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude was not intended to cover duties owed to the state, "such as services in the army, 
militia, on the jury, etc."); see also United States v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.) 
(requiring conscientious objector to perform civilian labor), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 
(1955); Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944) (same); United States v. Sutter, 
127 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (same); Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193, 201, 197 N.E. 
768, 772 (1935) (noting that thirteenth amendment does not prohibit state from requir-
ing services of citizens owed to state). 
103. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
104. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 757. 
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out compensation. 1011 Finally, the sixth amendment right to 
counsel in criminal proceedings may rationally be distinguished 
from appointments in civil cases because of the greater sanctions 
attending a criminal conviction. The dictum becomes even less 
significant because the existence of the tradition of forced ap-
pointment of which the Court speaks appears doubtful at 
best. 106 Thus, because the general goal of the thirteenth amend-
ment is a system of voluntary labor, the substitution of a court's 
will for the attorney's decision regarding for whom to work is a 
form of involuntary servitude. 
III. CALIFORNIA'S STATUTE AND SOME PROPOSALS 
Forced, uncompensated court appointments present a number 
of serious problems: unfairness to both attorneys and indigents, 
hinderance of the benefits derived from publicly funded civil lit-
igation, and unconstitutionality. Because the Supreme Court107 
and Congress108 are unlikely to redress these problems, state leg-
105. Id.; L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at § 16-42. One could argue that because forced 
representation is rooted in the legal tradition, the amendment was not meant to prohibit 
it. Cf. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (holding that statute requiring able-bodied 
males between 21 and 45 to work on public roads did not violate the thirteenth amend-
ment because the custom of road crews existed at the time of the amendment's enact-
ment). As Professor Shapiro writes, however, "(t]he custom of conscripting able-bodied 
men to work on road gangs may have long been recognized, but so was the custom of 
slavery itself in its most blatant form." Shapiro, supra note 11, at 769 (footnote omit-
ted). Further, it is not at all clear that there existed a tradition of forced representation. 
Id. at 753. Because early judges rarely appointed counsel in civil cases, the tradition is 
especially uncertain in the case of civil litigants. Id. at 750-53. 
One may also argue that court appointments do not differ from requirements that an 
individual serve as a witness, see, e.g., Hurtado·v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973), or 
perform labor in the armed forces, see, e.g., Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), 
or perform labor though a conscientious objector, see, e.g., United States v. Hoepker, 223 
F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). In these cases and in the case of 
road gangs, though, all people, or in some cases all males, are at risk. Shapiro, supra note 
11, at 769. Forced, uncompensated court-appointments are thus distinguishable, because 
they place only attorneys at risk. Id. 
106. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 750-53. 
107. Although the Supreme Court could resolve the forced appointment issue, the 
Court has seemed unwilling to address the question. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 
230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Or. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
978 (1966); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 
(1979). Moreover, even if the Court determined that forced appointments are constitu-
tional, the practice would remain unwise. See supra notes 17-54 and accompanying text. 
108. Recent congressional hostility toward the national legal services effort, however, 
see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text, makes an expansion of the national program 
unlikely. In addition, because a state or locally administered program could tailor organi-
zation to local needs, see infra notes 136-37, such a program would be preferable to a 
national program. 
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islative action is required. 109 Regretfully, "[t]here is no quick 
fix-no cheap, easy device for ensuring equal justice. Neither 
platitudes nor panaceas will suffice. "110 The following proposal, 
however, provides better representation for indigent civil liti-
gants and avoids the unfairness and constitutional problems of 
forced court appointments. 
Section A of the proposal borrows from a new California stat-
utem that offers a way of supplementing the funds presently 
available for compensating attorneys who represent indigent 
civil litigants. Section B offers a means of reducing the number 
of indigents who require representation by reducing spurious 
claims that waste available resources. Section C proposes an in-
tegration and effective allocation of pro bono attorneys and local 
organizations that regularly represent indigent clients without 
charge, to provide better representation for indigent civil liti-
gants than the forced appointment method. 
109. In fact, California enacted a statute in 1981, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CooE §§ 6210-
6228 (Deering Supp. 1984), to expand the availability and improve the quality of free 
legal services to indigent civil litigants. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
Massachusetts has authorized the creation of a committee to establish a system for rep-
resenting indigent litigants in criminal and noncriminal proceedings. MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 211D, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985). 
Legislative action remains necessary because courts lack the power to raise and dis-
tribute funding for large public programs and, even where such power exists, legislative 
action remains the preferred route to correct social problems. See Yarbrough v. Superior 
Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 748 (1983) (King, J., concurring) ("[T]he doctrine of separa-
tion of powers . . . precludes one branch of government from infringing upon and failing 
to adequately provide the resources for another branch of government to perform its 
constitutional functions"), vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 
(1985) (ordering trial court to reconsider whether appointment of counsel necessary to 
give defendant access to courts but not considering whether courts possess the power to 
appoint attorneys without compensation); Board of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420 
(Miss. 1970) (noting that courts lack power to order procurement of public funds to pay 
appointed counsel); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 585, 555 P.2d 490, 492 (1976) (noting 
that court lacks power to procure compensation for court-appointed attorney beyond 
that which legislature has designated); Note, supra note 9, at 1006 ("Clearly the appro-
priation of funds from the public treasury is a function of the legislature rather than the 
judiciary."). But see Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 818-23, 224 N.W.2d 
761, 763-65 (1975) (holding that court has power to require compensation for appointed 
attorney absent statutory provision); Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 51-53, 274 A.2d 193, 
196-97, (holding that courts can compel legislature to pay court funds reasonably neces-
sary for efficient and effective operation), cert. denied 402 U.S. 974 (1971). Shapiro, 
supra note 11, at 753; Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding 
of Judicial Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687 (1983); cf. Stanley v. City of Ferndale, 115 
Mich. App. 703, 709, 321 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1982) (holding that court could procure funds 
necessary to fulfill collective bargaining agreement with court employees). 
110. L. FoRER, supra note 2, at 204. 
111. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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In 1981, California enacted a statute to require the establish-
ment and maintenance of interest bearing demand trust ac-
counts used to compensate certain attorneys who represent indi-
gent civil litigants.112 Attorneys and law firms must deposit 
short-term client trust funds to earn interest in these ac-
counts.113 The interest, in turn, is paid to the state bar associa-
tion, which then distributes fund monies to qualified legal ser-
vices projects114 and qualified support organizations. m Although 
deposits to these accounts are mandatory in California, deposits 
should be voluntary to avoid invalidity under the taking 
clauses116 and because one group should not involuntarily bear 
the cost of a public good. 117 
This voluntary contribution to interest bearing demand ac-
counts, though, should only supplement public compensation of 
attorneys who represent indigent civil litigants. Because the 
public as a whole should provide representation to indigents, 118 
state and local governments should also directly compensate 
representation. Congressional reductions in the Legal Services 
Corporation's budget119 necessitate state and local funding. In 
addition, state and local governments can better tailor fund dis-
tribution to local needs. 120 This additional public funding would 
help eliminate ineffective representation and the problems asso-
ciated with it. 121 The creation of such a fund by other states 
would help increase resources available for providing representa-
tion to indigent civil litigants. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. § 6211. 
114. "Qualified legal services project [is defined as] a nonprofit project incorporated 
and operated exclusively in California which provides as its primary purpose and func-
tion legal services without charge to indigent persons .... " Id. § 6213(a). 
115. Id. § 6216(c). "Qualified support center" is defined as "an incorporated non-
profit legal services center, which has as its primary purpose and function the provision 
of legal training, legal technical assistance, or advocacy support without charge .... " 
Id. § 6213(b). 
116. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 17-54 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
120. See infra notes 136-37. 
121. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. 
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B. Reducing Spurious Claims 
The disproporationate number of spurious claims pursued by 
a small number of indigent litigants122 imposes heavy burdens 
on the courts and other litigants.123 Similarly, expending public 
funds on cases that private attorneys would accept on a contin-
gent fee basis also misallocates these resources. To eliminate this 
drain on funds, legal assistance organizations should provide at-
torneys to represent only those indigents who have tried unsuc-
cessfully to obtain counsel in another way12• but were not re-
fused representation because of the spuriousness of their claims. 
In response to these concerns, the California statute provides 
sound guidance regarding who should receive funding. Organiza-
tions that receive funds from the state bar association may ex-
pend these funds only on indigent civil litigants, qualified sup-
port services, and qualified legal services projects, and then only 
when the case is not "fee generating."1211 A case is not "fee gener-
ating" if adequate representation is unavailable and either: (1) a 
local lawyer referral service or two attorneys in private practice 
with experience in that particular area of law rejected the case; 
(2) a referral service or attorney would not consider the case 
without a consultation fee; (3) attorneys do not normally accept 
the type of case without prepayment of a fee; or (4) emergency 
circumstances demand immediate action.126 These criteria allow 
an indigent to obtain counsel either by establishing that al-
though no attorney would take the case on a contingent fee ba-
sis, the refusing attorneys did not find the indigent's claim 
spurious, or that an emergency demands immediate action. 
Under the California statute, funded organizations may also 
finance cases in three other situations where adequate represen-
tation is unavailable: (1) where recovery of damages is not the 
principal objective of the case; (2) where the case involves rights 
of the claimant under a publicly supported benefit program 
based on need; or (3) where the court has appointed counsel.127 
122. See Note, Abusiue Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts: Proposals for Judi-
cial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 93, 99-111 (1984). 
123. Id. at 111-15. 
124. Cf. Swygert, supra note 29, at 1292 (finding that among the federal courts, six 
courts required an indigent client to attempt to hire an attorney on a contingent fee 
basis or obtain one from a legal aid clinic). 
125. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CooE § 6223 (Deering Supp. 1984). Those cases that are not 
"fee generating" are defined at § 6213(e). 
126. Id. § 6213(e)(l). 
127. Id. § 6213(e)(2)-(4). 
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These situations also provide for the efficient allocation of re-
sources. If a client does not primarily seek to recover damages, 
then the case is far less likely to be frivolous. Similarly, if the 
case involves rights of the claimant under a publicly supported 
benefit program, then the rights will probably be of such impor-
tance that the case demands immediate action. In either case, 
the organizations are less likely to be financing spurious claims. 
The exception for appointed counsel should be rejected because 
of problems of deficient representation and constitutional inva-
lidity created by forced appointment. 
Organizations, such as the Legal Services Corporation, that do 
not employ interest bearing accounts but receive direct public or 
private funds should also use this screening process. Regardless 
of the source of financing, the review serves the same valuable 
purpose of protecting resources. 128 This review may place an ad-
ditional barrier before indigents attempting the already difficult 
task of obtaining representation. Nevertheless, requiring the re-
view should, by eliminating spurious claims and directing cases 
to attorneys willing to take them on a contingent fee basis, bet-
ter ensure that those indigents who need help will receive effec-
tive counsel. Additionally, the California statute does not ham-
string a legal services organization's ability to pursue its own 
goals. Organizations that receive funding may give deference to 
individuals who are members of groups that face discriminatory 
hurdles in addition to indigency. 129 
C. Achieving Effective Representation Services 
Effective representation can be achieved in two ways: first, 
through integration of pro bono and legal services organization 
attorneys and, second, through an allocation of attorneys based 
on local needs and attorney skill. 
1. Division and integration of labor- Two commentators 
have argued that "[o]rganized pro bono programs offer the most 
significant available potential for augmenting the national legal 
services effort. "130 They maintain that integration of legal ser-
vices organization staff attorneys ~nd independent pro bono 
counsel maximizes the effectiveness of all available attorney ser-
128. Cf. Swygert, supra note 29, at 1292 (noting that the Eighth Circuit has used an 
administrative panel which "reviews motions for appointment of counsel in civil rights 
cases and makes recommendations to the court"). 
129. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CooE § 6214(b)(3)(B) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
130. Palmer & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 854. 
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vices. 131 These two groups reflect different legal backgrounds.132 
If pro bono attorneys off er services in their area of expertise, 133 
indigent representation organizations and pro bono attorneys 
would not waste resources practicing in unfamiliar areas of 
law.134 In addition, because attorneys would be practicing in 
their areas of expertise, this integrated effort would also provide 
better representation for indigent clients.135 
2. Allocating services- Local fund recipients should first as-
sess the needs of their community and next assess the abilities 
of both fund recipient attorneys and pro bono attorneys. 136 At-
torneys can then produce the greatest benefit by taking cases in 
which their skills match indigents' legal needs. 137 After a fund-
receiving organization determines that an indigent should re-
ceive counsel, the organization can next determine whether ei-
ther a fund recipient attorney or an independent pro bono attor-
ney can better handle the claim and match the client 
accordingly.138 The California statute allocates a portion of the 
fund's resources for administration of the fund. 139 This alloca-
tion could cover the cost of integrating legal services organiza-
tion attorneys and independent counsel, and matching indigents 
with counsel. 
Assigning indigent cases to private attorneys requires finding 
those attorneys willing to represent these clients. To achieve 
this, courts and local bar associations should maintain a list of 
attorneys willing to represent indigent clients without compen-
sation or for a fee. ao Many attorneys may be willing to represent 
131. Id. at 851; see also infra notes 136-37. 
132. Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371, 377-78 (1966). 
133. Utton suggests that staff attorney programs are better, for instance, at educating 
local communities in preventive law, contracts, interest rates, repossession, garnishment, 
and utility rates. Staff attorney programs are likely to be better at identifying and re-
sponding to specific community needs. In contrast, generally, pro bono attorneys would 
probably prove to be better at providing seasoned expertise in specific areas of law. Id. at 
377. 
134. Palmer & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 852. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. The Los Angeles Legal Aid Foundation estimated that it can reach 10% of 
the eligible poor who need legal services. That leaves 750,000 eligible poor persons with-
out necessary legal services. Id. Palmer and Aaronson suggest that a successful recruit-
ment effort would result in 1,000 volunteer pro bono attorneys. If each pro bono attorney 
handled five clients per year, less than a 1 % increase in representation would result. Id. 
Therefore, Palmer and Aaronson conclude, individual representation by pro bono attor-
neys is insufficient. Id. 
137. Id. ("To be optimally effective, pro bono programs must begin to target for pri-
ority attention specific substantive areas and client groups."). 
138. Id. 
139. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CooE § 6216(a) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
140. See Swygert, supra note 29, at 1293 (finding that "[f]ourteen [of the federal] 
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indigents without compensation because, for example, of some 
sense of satisfaction derived from helping the needy. In addition, 
area legal services organizations should actively recruit attorneys 
willing to provide such representation. 141 
Assigning cases to these attorneys raises none of the problems 
associated with court-appointed counsel.142 If attorneys volun-
teer to serve without compensation then the motivation for serv-
ing will clearly not be money. Consequently, the disincentives of 
uncompensated appointments will be reduced and the indigent 
clients will receive more effective representation. Furthermore, 
the attorney-client relationship escapes intrusion because the re-
lationship of trust and confidence remains protected. Finally, 
the relationship's voluntary nature avoids the constitutional 
challenges associated with compelled representation. 
Nevertheless, a lack of volunteers willing to serve without 
compensation poses a potential problem. 143 Many law firms, 
however, compensate attorneys performing services for indi-
gents. w Bar association trust funds or direct public funding can 
reimburse those attorneys willing to give time but unwilling to 
bear certain costs, such as office costs or out-of-pocket expenses 
devoted to a representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Forcing attorneys to accept uncompensated court appoint-
ment in civil cases places a disproportionate burden of a public 
· good on certain attorneys. Placing this burden on uncompen-
sated attorneys eliminates the incentive that a fee provides and, 
therefore, may put indigent clients at a disadvantage in the judi-
courts maintain a list of attorneys willing to take civil rights cases on a pro bono or 
possibly a contingent-fee basis, and [that] three other districts are attempting to put 
such a list together"). 
141. Palmer & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 851. 
142. See supra notes 17-106 and accompanying text. 
143. See Swygert, supra note 29, at 1293 (noting that several federal courts have 
difficulty "find[ing] attorneys willing to take civil rights cases on a pro bono basis"). 
144. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS, 
1984-85 Academic Year (6th ed. 1984). The following law firms, inter alia, reported their 
treatment of a pro bono obligation: Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz of Detroit (supporting 
public interest activitites), id. at 529; Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison of Los Angeles (en-
couraging pro bono work and making available full staff support), id. at 44; Hughes, 
Hubbard & Reed of Los Angeles (encouraging public service activities), id. at 58; Fried, 
Frank, Harris, Shriven & Jacobson of New York (encouraging public service activities), 
id. at 648; Lord, Day & Lord of New York (supporting and encouraging voluntary public 
service activities), id. at 675. 
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cial process. As a result, those groups against which society has 
traditionally discriminated face an additional discriminatory 
hurdle. Moreover, this procedure also violates attorneys' consti-
tutional rights. To eliminate these problems, each state should 
establish a fund financed by the state bar and the state and local 
governments to compensate attorneys and organizations that 
voluntarily represent indigent civil litigants. These fund recipi-
ents should more efficiently employ funds already available by 
reducing wasteful. claims, and fund recipient organizations 
should work more closely with individual pro bono attorneys. 
-Greg Stevens 
